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Abstract
The speed of transition literature appears to have overlooked the fact that due to the
dynamic nature of the economy the post–transition economic performance influences op-
timal behavior already during transition. We illustrate the implications of this neglect
using the well–known model of Aghion and Blanchard (1994, Section 6.4). The correct
solution differs in several respects from the “approximate” solution presented by Aghion
and Blanchard. First, unemployment is increasing up to a certain endogenous point in
time, when, second, the remaining state sector is closed down. This point in time can be
defined as the end of transition. The correct solution is based on transforming the problem
to a type of a dynamic optimization problem often encountered in resource economics: a
scrap value problem with free terminal time.
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1 Introduction
The transition from a state controlled economy to a market economy has received considerable
attention over the last 25 years. Many formerly centrally planned economies have gone a long
way or have even completed their transition to market based economies. However, some other
centrally planned countries as well as a considerable number of semi-developed countries
are just starting or will in all likelihood embark on this process in the next few years. In
addition many countries, such as large oil producers, are still burdened with large inefficient
state sectors and/or state owned companies operating under soft budget constraints that
will at some point have to have to address efficiency enhancing reforms to avoid detrimental
economic development. Also, in a different context some authors, e.g. Brynjolfsson and
McAfee (2011), discuss that even well-developed market economies are facing potentially
dramatic transition processes due to the technological revolution ongoing under labels such
as “digitalization”, “industry 4.0” or “internet of things”. It is indeed possible that these
developments will necessitate huge reallocation of workforce across sectors. This process is
in many ways formally similar to the type of transition problem referred to here. Massive
technological change may lead to part of the economy finding itself with too many workers
with a resultant need for large-scale economic reorganization.
One important aspect, turning back to transition from a centrally planning to a market
based economy, of such a process is the macroeconomic management of the transition through
the transfer of resources, such as capital and labor, from the state controlled sector to the
emerging private sector. In this paper we argue that an important aspect of this macroe-
conomic management problem has been overlooked. This is the issue of when and how the
transition period should end. At some point in time the transfer of resources is completed and
we will show that this leads to the introduction of a constraint on the optimal policy that has
considerable impact on the transition process already before the end of the transition period.
This point is illustrated using the model Aghion and Blanchard (1994), which is an early,
important contribution with a solid microeconomic fundament to the literature on economic
transition from centrally planned to market economies. In their Section 6.4 they present a
dynamic optimization model to determine the optimal speed of transition and the resultant
optimal unemployment rate (see also the description in Roland, 2000).1 When solving the
1For detailed discussion concerning labor market dynamics in transition see Boeri (2000). Our contribution
here is of a methodological nature and thus several aspects of labor market dynamics that are found to be
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dynamic optimization problem, Aghion and Blanchard do not, in fact, derive the exact solu-
tion but only an “approximate” solution, which neglects the behavior of the economy after
the state sector has been closed down, see in particular their footnote 33 on p. 305. Due
to the dynamic nature of the economy the post–transition economic performance influences
the optimal behavior during transition and thus influences the optimal path also whilst the
state sector still employs people. The behavior of the economy at the state sector closure
is neglected also in other speed of transition models. Brixiova and Yousef (2000) assume a
constant closure rate of the state sector, which may also lead to welfare losses and different
dynamic behavior compared to optimal closure. Burda (1993) also finds a constant optimal
unemployment rate, where again the effect of state sector closure is not analyzed in detail.
Castanheira and Roland (2000) avoid the problem by assuming that there is no unemployment
and that capital can be be moved freely from the old to the new sector.
Focusing as mentioned only on the Aghion and Blanchard model we derive in this paper
the correct solution to the dynamic optimization problem and show that by including end–of–
transition effects the resultant optimal path has several interesting features. It turns out that
a proper analysis of the model gives rise to richer dynamics than might be expected when
resorting to what Aghion and Blanchard label “turnpike” approximation. In particular we
show that (correct) optimal paths have the following properties: Up to a certain point in time,
say τ , the government assumes an active role on the labor market by shrinking the inefficient
state sector. This is done at an increasing rate, hence the optimal unemployment rate is
not constant. At time τ the government closes down the (remaining) inefficient state sector
and does not intervene in the labor market any further. Hence, at time τ the unemployment
rate jumps and from there on gradually moves towards zero. Thus, in this model the end of
transition occurs at time τ , where the remaining state sector is closed down in a discontinuous
fashion. It holds that τ is endogenous and has to be chosen optimally by the government.
Furthermore, it holds that the correct optimal unemployment rate is larger than the rate
proposed by Aghion and Blanchard over the transition period. Thus, the path obtained by
Aghion and Blanchard leads to welfare losses. The reason for the lower unemployment rate
over a longer period leading to welfare losses is that the lower unemployment rate leads to
relevant are, as in the model of Aghion and Blanchard (1994), neglected. Also, of course, this type of model
has to be interpreted in a stylized fashion with respect to the role of the state in an economy. All aspects of
state activity present also in market based economies are not in the focus of the paper and simply neglected
to focus on the core issue. For the same reason we also abstract from reform uncertainty and potential reform
reversal, issues discussed in Dewatripont and Roland (1995) or Fernandez and Rodrik (1991).
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slower job growth in the more efficient private sector and thus unnecessarily delays output
growth compared to the optimal faster transition path.
The results presented here may perhaps be best understood by noticing that the problem is
formally similar to the problem of extracting an exhaustible resource. The stock of individuals
employed in the state sector is the resource that can be “mined”. Discounting and the fact
that the resource at some point is exhausted gives rise to extraction paths that are non-
constant. The difference to the resource problem lies in that the process of mining a resource
yields profits that represent instantaneous benefits, whereas in the present model, mining
(i.e. unemployment) is costly. This explains why models of exhaustible resources predict that
resources should be mined at a decreasing rate whereas the present model prescribes that
unemployment should increase over the interval [0, τ).
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we set up and analyze the Aghion and
Blanchard (1994) model in detail and Section 3 briefly concludes.
2 The Model and the Correct Solution
We restrict the description of the model on the dynamic optimization problem presented
in Section 6.4 of Aghion and Blanchard (1994) and discuss only those parts of the analysis
presented in their paper in detail that are immediately relevant here.
Denote with E(t) the number of people employed in the state sector (with constant
marginal productivity x), with N(t) the number of people employed in the emerging pri-
vate sector (with constant marginal productivity y) and with U(t) the number of unemployed
people at time t. Population is normalized to one, i.e. E(t)+N(t)+U(t) = 1. At the outset of
transition, employment in the state sector drops from 1 to E(0) < 1. Aghion and Blanchard
(1994) develop an efficiency-wage based explanation for costly labor adjustment between the
old state and the new private sector. In particular, they derive the following relationship for
the speed of job creation in the new private sector (developed in their equation (9) on page
298):2
N˙ = f(U) = a
[
U
U + ca
] [
y − rc−
(
b
1− U
)]
(1)
with a, b, c and r positive constants. a is a parameter indicating how much the speed in private
job creation is affected by profits per worker in the private sector, b is unemployment benefits,
2To avoid overloaded notation we sometimes skip the time index t.
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r is the discount rate and c is a constant indicating how much the equilibrium wage responds
to improvements in employment prospects for the unemployed. The cost of job creation in the
private sector is given by 12ar (f(U))
2. The state sector declines over time and the government
chooses the speed of closure and hence of unemployment.
The government is only concerned with efficiency and chooses employment in the state
sector3 to maximize the present discounted value of output. This optimization problem is
given by:
max
E(t)
∫ ∞
0
[
E(t)x+N(t)y − 1
2ar
f (U(t))2
]
e−rtdt (2)
subject to:
N˙(t) = f(U(t)) (3)
N(0) = 0 (4)
E(t) +N(t) + U(t) = 1 (5)
and non-negativity of E(t), N(t) and U(t).
Based on the relation that E(t) + N(t) + U(t) = 1, one immediately observes that the
problem can equivalently be formulated by using U(t) as the control and by eliminating E(t),
which leaves us with only U(t) and N(t) in both the objective function and the constraints.4
This formulation of the problem is given by:
max
U∈[0,1]
∫ ∞
0
[
(1−N(t)− U(t))x+N(t)y − 1
2ar
f (U(t))2
]
e−rtdt (6)
subject to:
N˙(t) = f(U(t)) (7)
N(t) ∈ [0, 1] (8)
N(t) + U(t) ≤ 1 (9)
3See below that this is equivalent to choosing unemployment.
4We perform this substitution to have U , postulated to be constant along optimal paths by Aghion and
Blanchard (1994), as the control variable.
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Note first that an optimal path may have one of the following properties: There exists a
τ <∞ such that τ = inft≥0(N(t) +U(t) = 1) or condition (9) is not binding for any finite t.
These two cases will be discussed separately below. Before doing so, an important property
of the model is derived in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Along any path it holds that N(t) < 1 for all t <∞.
Proof : For values of N(t) sufficiently close to 1, the largest possible value of N˙(t) is given
by setting U(t) = 1 − N(t). The ordinary differential equation N˙(t) = f(1 − N(t)) has a
stable steady state at N = 1, hence N(t) approaches 1 only asymptotically. 
An additional problem with the model is that the Hamiltonian may have two local maxima
with respect to U . However, this problem can easily be dispensed with: If Û is the larger
of these two maxima, then it is easy to show that there is some value U˜ < Û such that
f(U˜) = f(Û). If this is the case, then U˜ leads to the same rate of job creation at a lesser
cost, so Û cannot be optimal. Hence, we can disregard the possibility of two local maxima of
the Hamiltonian in the sequel.
Let us now turn to study the possible optimal paths in detail. We start with the case that
the constraint (9) becomes binding for the first time at some τ <∞. Given that state sector
employment is monotonically non-increasing, it follows that for t ≥ τ the control problem
has a trivial optimal solution. Denote with N(t,Nτ ) the solution to the differential equation
N˙(t) = f(1−N(t)) solved over (τ,∞) with initial condition N(τ) = Nτ . Note that it trivially
holds that ∂N(τ,Nτ )∂Nτ = 1 and also note that up to now both τ and Nτ are unspecified.
The objective function of the optimization problem from τ onwards is given by:
V (τ,Nτ ) =
∫ ∞
τ
[
N (t,Nτ ) y − 1
2ar
f (1−N (t,Nτ ))2
]
e−rtdt (10)
Note the following relationships for the partial derivatives of the objective function (10):
∂V (τ,Nτ )
∂τ
= −
[
N (t,Nτ ) y − 1
2ar
f (1−N (t,Nτ ))2
]
e−rτ (11)
∂V (τ,Nτ )
∂Nτ
=
∞∫
τ
[
y +
1
ar
f (1−N (t,Nτ )) f ′ (1−N (t,Nτ ))
]
e−rtdt
=
y
r
e−rτ +
∞∫
τ
[
1
ar
f (1−N (t,Nτ )) f ′ (1−N (t,Nτ ))
]
e−rtdt (12)
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Now the optimization problem corresponding to the case considered can be rewritten as
a scrap value problem with free terminal time, i.e. τ is to be chosen optimally as well:
max
U∈[0,1],τ∈[0,∞)
 τ∫
0
[
(1−N − U)x+Ny − 1
2ar
f (U)2
]
e−rtdt+ V (τ,N (τ))
 (13)
subject to (7), (8) and (9).
Problems of this type are studied in Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987, Theorem 3 and Note 2,
p. 182–184), where necessary conditions for optimality are presented. The Hamiltonian cor-
responding to this problem is given by H = (1−N − U)x+Ny − 12arf(U)2 + µf(U), where
we ignore, for brevity, the other constraints (8) and (9) and the associated multipliers. It is
straightforward but cumbersome to present the solution including these additional terms in
the Hamiltonian. It can be shown that these constraints will not be binding, except possibly
at t = 0 and t =∞.5
Necessary conditions for optimality are given by:
−x− 1
ar
f (U) f ′ (U) + µf ′ (U) = 0 (14)
µ˙ = rµ+ x− y (15)
Furthermore, the following transversality condition has to hold:
µ (τ) e−rτ =
∂V (τ,Nτ )
∂Nτ
(16)
The optimal terminal time τ is found from:
He−rτ +
∂V (τ,Nτ )
∂τ
= 0 (17)
Equation (15) gives the following solution for µ(t):
µ(t) =
y − x
r
+Kert (18)
Here K is a constant whose value has to be determined from the transversality condition (16).
Remark 1 The solution proposed by Aghion and Blanchard (1994) is derived from the above
differential equation (18) by setting K = 0. This implies a constant value of the costate vari-
able µ(t) ≡ y−xr and thus a constant unemployment rate. Inserting µ = y−xr in equation (14)
5In fact, it can be shown that the only possible case where any other constraint than U(t) + N(t) ≤ 1 is
binding for t <∞ is the case where U (0) = 1, in which case τ = 0.
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leads to the solution proposed by Aghion and Blanchard (1994), see their equation (26) on
p. 309.
As noted in Aghion and Blanchard (1994) and also mentioned in the introduction, this
cannot be the correct solution for all values of t, since due to private sector job creation (which
happens at a constant rate for constant unemployment) at some point the unemployment rate
has to decline. We show below, however, that even before the end of transition, the optimal
unemployment rate is not constant.
Let us next determine K, or to be more precise, let us determine whether it is equal
to zero or not for optimal paths. This can be achieved by inserting (18) and (12) into the
transversality condition (16). After some rearrangements this yields:
Kerτ =
x
r
+
∞∫
τ
[
1
ar
f (1−N (t,Nτ )) f ′ (1−N (t,Nτ ))
]
e−r(t−τ)dt (19)
In order to sign K, we need to sign the last term in the square brackets in this equation. The
following proposition is helpful.
Proposition 2 Along an optimal path, f ′ (U (t)) > 0 for all t.
Proof: First, note that for any choice of τ and Nτ there is a segment [τ + d,∞) such
that f ′ (1−N (t,Nτ )) = f ′ (U (t)) > 0 for all t ∈ [τ + d,∞). This is a straightforward im-
plication of U (t) becoming small as N (t) goes to 1. In particular, this implies that paths
where f ′ (U (t)) > 0 for all t are always feasible if U (t) is chosen to be small enough. Second,
note that for every Û such that f ′(Û) < 0, there is a value U˜ < Û such that f(U˜) = f(Û)
and f ′(U˜) > 0. Since U˜ and Û give the same rate of job creation, but higher values of U are
more costly, it follows that for the optimal choice of U it will always hold that f ′ (U (t)) > 0.
Taken together these two facts imply that it is always possible to choose paths such that
f ′ (U (t)) > 0 for all t and it is not optimal to choose any other paths. Thus, the proposition
follows. 
Proposition 2 implies that the second term on the right hand side of (19), f ′ (1−N (t,Nτ )),
is positive and hence, the right hand side is positive. Consequently, it follows that K is pos-
itive. This implies that µ(t) is not constant over time and thus the optimal unemployment
rate is also not constant over time. In fact it follows that the optimal unemployment rate
8
U N+ = 1
U
N1
1
U( )
lim ( )t U t
{Jump in ( ) atend of transitionU t
Solution path proposed by
Aghion and Blanchard
Figure 1: The transition process in (N,U)-space. The optimal unemployment rate increases
continuously until time τ , where the remaining state sector is closed and the unemployment
rate jumps to 1 − N(τ) to gradually decline to zero afterwards. The figure also shows the
lower constant unemployment rate corresponding to the solution of Aghion and Blanchard.
is increasing over time until τ , which is to be determined from equation (17). The fact that
K > 0 implies that µ(t) is larger than y−xr for all t < τ . This implies that U(t) corresponding
to the optimal solution is larger than derived in Aghion and Blanchard. Consequently it
follows that the transition period is shorter than suggested by Aghion and Blanchard.
There is another interesting feature: The optimal unemployment rate is discontinuous at
time τ and hence the optimal path for the unemployment rate is as illustrated in Figure 1,
with the result derived analytically below.
Proposition 3 For an optimal path of the unemployment rate it holds that lim
t→τ−
U(t) <
1−N(t). This implies that U (t) is discontinuous at τ .
Proof: The proof is by contradiction, therefore assume that lim
t→τ−
U(t) = 1−N(t). Then
equation (17) implies that µ(τ)f(1−N(τ)) = 0. This in turn implies, since N(τ) < 1 (which
follows from Proposition 1), that µ(τ) = 0. Then equation (18) implies that K < 0, since
y > x by assumption. However, K < 0 is in contradiction with (19). This shows the propo-
sition. 
To complete our analysis it remains to be shown that the second case, where condition (9)
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does not become binding for any finite t, cannot lead to optimal paths. Note first that, also in
this case, K 6= 0, because K = 0 implies a constant unemployment rate (compare Remark 1).
This follows from inserting (18) in (14), both of which now have to hold for all t ≥ 0 for
optimal paths. Since a constant unemployment rate implies a constant job creation rate,
eventually the unemployment rate has to decrease because of constant population size. Thus,
K 6= 0. This implies that µ(t) diverges to either plus or minus infinity, depending upon the
sign of K. However, such a path of µ(t) cannot fulfill the necessary condition (14) for all
t ≥ 0, since both f(U) and f ′(U) are bounded. This shows that indeed such paths cannot be
optimal.
3 Conclusions
Using the model for the optimal speed of transition of Aghion and Blanchard (1994, Sec-
tion 6.4) we discuss in this note some properties of optimal solutions of such speed of tran-
sition models. The analysis has to take into account the behavior of the economy after the
closure of the state sector, which has repercussions on the optimal behavior during transition.
Such problems can be formulated as scrap value problems with free terminal time, which
typically arise in exhaustible resource extraction problems.
The correct optimal unemployment paths derived in this paper differ in two respects from
the “approximate” solution presented in Aghion and Blanchard (1994). First, the optimal
unemployment rate is increasing over time until, second, the state sector is shut down entirely
at a certain point in time. This leads to a discontinuity in the unemployment rate at this point
in time. The point in time where the government closes the inefficient remaining state sector
entirely defines (in this stylized model) the end of transition. Afterwards the government does
not assume an active role in the labor market. Note again, as discussed in the introduction,
that the non-constancy of the optimal unemployment rate is a similarity to the solutions
typically found for exhaustible resource extraction problems.
The analysis put forward in this paper for the Aghion and Blanchard (1994) model appears
by analogy useful also for other transition models. On a more general scale we speculate, based
on the results in this paper, that it might be fruitful for the transition literature to borrow
further insights from resource economics.
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